Detecting Data Races in Parallel Programs (Part 2)

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Detecting Data Races in Cilk Programs that use Locks

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Mutual Exclusion in Cilk: Locks

cilk_lock(L)

critical section

cilk_unlock(L)

Assumptions about Locking

- Lock/unlock pair is contained in a single thread
- Holding a lock across a parallel control construct is forbidden

Terminology

- "Lock set" of an access: set of locks held when access is performed
- Lock set of several accesses: intersection of individual sets

A Cilk Program with a Data Race

```
int x;
                              cilk void foo3() {
Cilk_lockvar A, B;
                                Cilk_lock(&B);
                                 x++;
cilk void foo1() {
                               Cilk_unlock(&B);
                              }
  Cilk_lock(&A);
 Cilk_lock(&B);
 x += 5;
Cilk_unlock(&B);
                              cilk int main() {
                                Cilk_lock_init(&A);
  Cilk_unlock(&A);
                                Cilk_lock_init(&B);
                                x = 0;
                                spawn foo1();
cilk void foo2() {
                                spawn foo2();
 Cilk_lock(&A);
                                spawn foo3();
 x -= 3;
Cilk_unlock(&A);
                                sync;
                                printf("%d", x);
                              }
```

- Conflicting accesses: at least one is a WRITE
- No ordering by happens before <u>and</u> no common lock

SP-Parse Tree



Apparent vs. Feasible Races

initial condition: x = 0

 $\frac{T1}{z = 1}$ lock(L) x = 2 unlock(L)

$$\frac{T2}{lock(L)}$$

y = x
unlock(L)
if (y == 2) ... = z

Detecting Races in Cilk

- Data race if the lock set for two parallel accesses to the same location is empty and at least one is a WRITE
- Problem: "At least one is a WRITE" is cumbersome
- Simplification
 - introduce a fake R-LOCK
 - as if implicitly acquired and held for the duration of a read
 - for race detector: R-LOCK behaves as regular lock
 - if the lock set of two parallel accesses to the same location is empty, then a data race exists

Two Algorithms for Race Detection

- ALL-SETS general serial race detection algorithm
- BRELLY faster serial race detection algorithm limited to "umbrella locking discipline"

ALL-SETS uses SP-Bags Representation



Use SP-Bags to determine concurrency relationship

ALL-SETS Protocol

ACCESS(l) in thread e with lock set H			Cilk_lock(&A); Cilk_lock(&B);	
1	for each $\langle e', H' \rangle \in lockers[l]$	READ Cilk	(/) $\{A, B, R-LOCK\}$	
2	do if $e' \parallel e$ and $H' \cap H = \{\}$	Cilk	<pre>lock(&B); Cilk_lock(&C);</pre>	
3	then declare a data race	WRIT	$E(I) \qquad \{\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{C}\}$	
4	<i>redundant</i> ← FALSE	CILK	unlock(&C); Cilk_unlock(&B);	
5	for each $\langle e', H' \rangle \in lockers[l]$			
6	do if $e' \prec e$ and $H' \supseteq H$		check for race:	
7	then $lockers[l] \leftarrow lockers[l] - \{\langle e', H' \rangle\}$		parallel accesses	
8	if $e' \parallel e$ and $H' \subseteq H$			
9	then redundant \leftarrow TRUE		prune redundant lock sets	
10	if $redundant = FALSE$		add now look oot if not	
11	then $lockers[l] \leftarrow lockers[l] \cup \{\langle e, H \rangle\}$		redundant	

lockers(L): set of tuples <thread, lock set>

set of locks held by previous access to L by thread

Detects a race in a Cilk execution based on a given input if and only if a data race exists in the execution.

- if: any race reported between accesses by ALL-SETS meets the condition for a race: no common lock
- only if: if a race between accesses A and C exists in the computation, a race will be reported
 - —if lock set for A was not added to lockers, there must be another parallel access with a smaller lock set. a race will be reported.
 - -what if there was an intervening non-racing access B that caused a lock set for A to be removed from the lock set?
 - there can be no such access B
 - B must have a larger lock set if it doesn't race
 - a lock set will be removed only if its lock set is larger than B's
 - thus, the A won't have its lock set removed

ALL-SETS Properties

- Cilk program executes in time T
- Uses V variables
- Uses a total of n locks; no more than k simultaneously
- Let L = max number of distinct lock sets used for any location
- Time: O(TL(k + α(V,V))
 - loose upper bound for L: L ≤ sum of n choose i, i = 0, k = O(n^k/k!)
 - at most 2L series/parallel tests (lines 2, 6) at cost of $O(\alpha(V,V))$
 - lock set comparisons take at most O(k) time
- Space: O(kLV)
 - each lock set takes at most k space

ALL-SETS vs. BRELLY

- ALL-SETS detects data races directly
 - but at asymptotically high cost: factor of n^k slower than SPbags protocol
- Umbrella locking discipline
 - requires each that each location be protected by <u>the same</u> lock within every parallel subcomputation
 - threads in series may use different locks (or none)
- BRELLY only detects violations of the "umbrella" locking discipline, which precludes races

more restrictive locking discipline than ALL-SETS requires

What's Not in the Umbrella Discipline?

- Umbrella discipline requires that all sections in a parallel subcomputation use the <u>same</u> lock for a variable
- One thread uses A&B
- Two serial computations in parallel with first use
 - only A
 - only B



Umbrellas in SP-Parse Tree



Understanding our Example with its SP-Parse



Umbrellas and Races

A Cilk computation with a data race violates the umbrella discipline

- Any two threads involved in a race must have a P-node as their LCA in the SP-Parse
- The LCA P-node is the root of an unprotected umbrella

—both threads access the same location

-their lock sets are disjoint

BRELLY Protocol

Simplication: unlike ALL-SETS, keep only single lock set per location

ACCESS(l) in thread e with lock set H

1 **if** accessor[l] $\prec e$

2	then ▷ serial access			
	locks[$l] \leftarrow H$, leaving <i>nonlocker</i> [h] with its old		
	nor	locker if it was already in <i>locks</i> [l] but		
	sett	ing $nonlocker[h] \leftarrow accessor[l]$ otherwise		
3	for each lock $h \in locks[l]$			
4	do $alive[h] \leftarrow TRUE$			
5	access	$sor[l] \leftarrow e$		
6	else ⊳ par	rallel access		
7	for each lock $h \in locks[l] - H$			
8	do if $alive[h] = TRUE$			
9	then $alive[h] \leftarrow FALSE$			
10	$nonlocker[h] \leftarrow e$			
11	for each lock $h \in locks[l] \cap H$			
12	do if $alive[h] = TRUE$ and $nonlocker[h] e$			
13	then $alive[h] \leftarrow FALSE$			
14	if no locks in $locks[l]$ are alive (or $locks[l] = \{\}$)			
15	then report violation on <i>l</i> involving			
	e and accessor[l]			
16	for each lock $h \in H \cap locks[l]$			
17		do report access to <i>l</i> without <i>h</i>		
		by nonlocker[h]		

Tag lock h in the lock set for L with

- nonlocker[h] a thread accessing L without holding h
- alive[h] whether h should be considered as belonging to the umbrella
 - kill h rather than removing from lock set to improve precision of race reports

BRELLY at Work

$\frac{\text{Notation}}{A(x) : x \text{ is non-locker of A}}$ $\frac{A}{A} : A \text{ is not alive}$

- e₇ finds itself in parallel with nonlocker e₄ for B
- kills lock B leaving no live locks
- causes a data race to be detected



BRELLY Properties

- Cilk program executes in time T
- Uses V variables
- Uses a total of n locks; no more than k simultaneously
- Time: O(kT α (V,V))
 - tests if nonlocker[h] || e dominate running time
 - at most k series/parallel tests at cost of O(α (V,V)) each
- Space: O(kV)
 - at most k locks per variable

Cilkscreen

- Detects and reports <u>data races</u> when program terminates
 - finds all data races even those by third-party or system libraries

```
// code with a data race
int sum = 0;
cilk_for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
    sum += a[i];
}</pre>
```

- Does not report determinacy races
 - e.g. two concurrent strands use a lock to access a queue
 - enqueue & dequeue operations could occur in different order potentially leads to different result

Race Detection Strategies in Cilkscreen

- Lock covers
 - two conflicting accesses to a variable don't race if some lock
 L is held while each of the accesses is performed by a strand
- Happens-before
 - two conflicting accesses do not race if one must <u>happen</u> <u>before</u> the other
 - access A is by a strand X, which precedes the spawn of strand Y which performs access B
 - access A is performed by strand X, which precedes a sync that is an ancestor of strand Y

Cilkscreen Race Example

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}

#include <stdio.h>
#include <cilk++/cilk_mutex.h>

```
int sum = 0;
cilk::mutex m;
```

#ifdef SYNCH #define LOCK m.lock() #define UNLOCK m.unlock() #else #define LOCK #define UNLOCK #endif

```
void do_accum(int I, int u)
```

```
if (u == I) { LOCK; sum += I; UNLOCK; }
else {
    int mid = (u+I)/2;
    cilk_spawn do_accum(I, mid);
    do_accum(mid+1, u);
    }
int cilk_main()
```

```
do_accum(0, 1000);
printf("sum = %d\n", sum);
```

```
int ssum = 0;
for (int i = 0; i <= 1000; i++) ssum +=i;
printf("serial sum = %d\n", ssum);
```

Cilkscreen Limitations

- Only detects races between Cilk++ strands
 - depends upon their strict fork/join paradigm
- Only detects races that occur given the input provided
 - does not prove the absence of races for other inputs
 - choose your testing inputs carefully!
- Cilkscreen runs serially, 15-30x slower
- Cilkscreen increases the memory footprint of an application
 - could cause an error if too large
- If you build your program with debug information, cilkscreen will associate races with source line numbers

Cilkscreen Output

Race on location 0x6033c0 between

/users/johnmc/tests/race.cilk:17: _Z8do_accumii+0x31 (eip=0x40167d)

and

/users/johnmc/tests/race.cilk:17: _Z8do_accumii+0x31 (eip=0x40167d)

/users/johnmc/tests/race.cilk:21: _Z8do_accumii+0x6a (eip=0x4016b6) called from here

/users/johnmc/tests/race.cilk:20: __cilk_spawn_do_accum_000+0x79 (eip=0x40161d) called from here

/users/johnmc/tests/race.cilk:20: _Z8do_accumii+0x5c (eip=0x4016a8) called from here

/users/johnmc/tests/race.cilk:20: __cilk_spawn_do_accum_000+0x79 (eip=0x40161d) called from here

/users/johnmc/tests/race.cilk:20: _Z8do_accumii+0x5c (eip=0x4016a8) called from here

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SigRace: Signature-based Race Detection

Abdullah Muzahid, Dario Suarez,

Shanxiang Qi, Josep Torrellas

The Big Picture

- People like shared-memory models for parallel programming
- Data races are a significant problem
 - most people don't write programs in languages like Ct or NESL
- Software-only data race detection is slow
 - perhaps as much as 50x
- Every 18 months: 2x transistors on a chip

Hardware Support for Race Detection

- Monitor accesses in hardware and detect races
- Typical approach
 - tag data in caches with timestamps as accesses occur
 - piggyback tags & race detection on cache coherence protocol
 - invalidation, external read of a dirty line
- Specific approaches
 - happened-before (ReEnact, CORD, Min & Choi)
 - locksets (HARD)
- SigRace approach
 - don't require changes to L1 cache!
 - don't change the coherence protocol

FastTrack: Efficient and Precise Dynamic Race Detection (+ identifying destructive races)

Cormac Flanagan UC Santa Cruz

Stephen Freund Williams College



Cost



Cost



(

Thread A Thread B Happens-Before • Event Ordering: $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$ - program order - synchronization order rel(m) • Types of Races: - Write-Write acq(m) - Write-Read (write before read) Roce $\mathbf{x} = 1$ - Read-Write (read before write)

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Write-Write and Write-Read Races



No Races Yet: Writes Totally Ordered!

Thread A

Thread B

Thread C Thread D



No Races Yet: Writes Totally Ordered!

Thread A

Thread B

Thread C Thread D









Read-Write Races -- Ordered Reads



Most common case: thread-local, lock-protected, ...

Read-Write Races -- Unordered Reads

Thread A Thread B Thread C x = 0 fork read x read x read x ? x = 2











RoadRunner Architecture

Standard JVM



Validation

- Six race condition checkers
 - all use RoadRunner
 - share common components (eg, VectorClock)
 - profiled and optimized
- Further optimization opportunities
 - unsound extensions, dynamic escape analysis, static analysis, implement inside JVM, hardware support, ...
- 15 Benchmarks
 - 250 KLOC
 - locks, wait/notify, fork/join, barriers, ...



Slowdown (x Base Time)



O(n) Vector Clock Operations



O(n) Vector Clock Operations



Memory Usage

• FastTrack allocated ~200x fewer VCs

Checker	Memory Overhead
Basic VC, DJIT+	7.9x
FastTrack	2.8x

(Note: VCs for dead objects can be garbage collected)

• Improvements

- accordion clocks [CB 01]
- analysis granularity [PS 03, YRC 05] (see paper)

Eclipse 3.4

- Scale
 - > 6,000 classes
 - 24 threads
 - custom sync. idioms



- Precision (tested 5 common tasks)
 - Eraser: ~1000 warnings
 - FastTrack: ~30 warnings
- Performance on compute-bound tasks
 - > 2x speed of other precise checkers
 - same as Eraser

Beyond Detecting Race Conditions

- FastTrack finds real race conditions
 - races correlated with defects
 - cause unintuitive behavior on relaxed memory
- Which race conditions are real bugs?
 - that cause erroneous behaviors (crashes, etc)
 - and are not "benign race conditions"

```
class Point {
 double x, y;
 static Point p;
 Point() { x = 1.0; y = 1.0; }
 static Point get() {
   Point t = p;
   if (t != null) return t;
   synchronized (Point.class) {
     if (p==null) p = new Point();
     return p;
   }
  }
 static double slope() {
   return get().x / get().y;
 }
 public static void main(String[] args) {
   fork { System.out.println( slope() ); }
   fork { System.out.println( slope() ); }
  }
}
```

<u>Thread O</u>	<u>Thread 1</u>	<u>Thread 2</u>
<pre>p = null px = 0 py = 0 fork 1,2</pre>		
		<pre>read p // null acquire read p // null p = new Point px = 1 py = 1 release read px // get 1 read py // get 1</pre>
	read p // non- read px // ?	null





- Race: can return either write (mm non-determinism)
- Typical JVM: mostly sequentially consistent
- Adversarial memory
 - use heuristics to return older stale values

ThreadSanitizer, MemorySanitizer

Scalable run-time detection of uninitialized memory reads and data races with LLVM instrumentation

Timur Iskhodzhanov, Alexander Potapenko, Alexey Samsonov, Kostya Serebryany, Evgeniy Stepanov, Dmitry Vyukov

LLVM developers' meeting, Nov 8 2012

ThreadSanitizer data races

ThreadSanitizer v1

- Race detector based on Valgrind
- Used since early 2009
- Slow (20x–300x slowdown)
 - Still, found thousands races
 - Faster & more usable than others
 - Helgrind (Valgrind)
 - Intel Parallel Inspector (PIN)
- WBIA'09

ThreadSanitizer v2 overview

- Simple compile-time instrumentation
 ~400 LOC
- Redesigned run-time library
 - Fully parallel
 - No expensive atomics/locks on fast path
 - Scales to huge apps
 - Predictable memory footprint
 - Informative reports

TSan report example: data race

```
void Thread1() { Global = 42; }
int main() {
 pthread create(&t, 0, Thread1, 0);
 Global = 43;
  . . .
% clang -fsanitize=thread -g a.c -fPIE -pie && ./a.out
WARNING: ThreadSanitizer: data race (pid=20373)
 Write of size 4 at 0x7f... by thread 1:
    #0 Thread1 a.c:1
  Previous write of size 4 at 0x7f... by main thread:
    #0 main a.c:4
  Thread 1 (tid=20374, running) created at:
    #0 pthread create ??:0
    #1 main a.c:3
```

Compiler instrumentation


Direct shadow mapping (64-bit Linux)

Shadow = 4 * (Addr & kMask);

Application 0x7ffffffffff 0x7f0000000000

Protected 0x7efffffffff

0x2000000000000

Shadow 0x1fffffffff 0x18000000000

Protected

0x17ffffffff 0x000000000000

Shadow cell

An 8-byte shadow cell represents one memory access:

- ~16 bits: TID (thread ID)
- ~42 bits: Epoch (scalar clock)
- 5 bits: position/size in 8-byte word
- 1 bit: IsWrite

Full information (no more dereferences)

TID
Еро
Pos
IsW

4 shadow cells per 8 app. bytes



Example: first access



Example: second access

	T1	т2	
	E1	E2	
 Read in thread T2			
	0:2	4:8	
	W	R	

Example: third access

	T1	Т2	тЗ	
	E1	E2	E3	
Read in thread T3				
	0:2	4:8	0:4	
	W	R	R	

Example: race?

Race if **E1** does not "happen-before" **E3**

T1	т2	тЗ	
E1	E2	E3	
0:2	4:8	0:4	
W	R	R	

Fast happens-before

- Constant-time operation
 - Get TID and Epoch from the shadow cell
 - 1 load from thread-local storage
 - 1 comparison
- Similar to FastTrack (PLDI'09)

Shadow word eviction

• When all shadow cells are filled, one random cell is replaced

Informative reports

- Stack traces for two memory accesses:
 - current (easy)
 - previous (hard)
- TSan1:
 - Stores fixed number of frames (default: 10)
 - Information is never lost
 - Reference-counting and garbage collection

Stack trace for previous access

- Per-thread cyclic buffer of events
 - 64 bits per event (type + PC)
 - Events: memory access, function entry/exit
 - Information will be lost after some time
 - Buffer size is configurable
- Replay the event buffer on report
 - Unlimited number of frames

Function interceptors

- 100+ interceptors
 - malloc, free, ...
 - o pthread_mutex_lock, ...
 - strlen, memcmp, ...
 - read, write, ...

Atomics

- LLVM atomic instructions are replaced with __tsan_* callbacks
- %0 = load atomic i8* %a acquire, align 1
- %0 = call i8
- @__tsan_atomic8_load(i8* %a, i32 504)

TSan slowdown vs clang -O1

Application	TSan1	TSan2	TSan1/TSan2
RPC benchmark	40x	7x	5.5x
Web server test	25x	2.5x	10x
String util test (1 thread)	50x	6x	8.5x

Trophies

- 200+ races in Google server-side apps (C++)
- 80+ races in Go programs
 25+ bugs in Go stdlib
- Several races in OpenSSL
 1 fixed, ~5 'benign'
- More to come
 We've just started testing Chrome :)

Key advantages

- Speed
 - \circ > 10x faster than other tools
- Native support for atomics
 - Hard or impossible to implement with binary translation (Helgrind, Intel Inspector)

Limitations

- Only 64-bit Linux
- Hard to port to 32-bit platforms
 - Small address space
 - Relies on atomic 64-bit load/store
- Heavily relies on TLS
 Slow TLS on some platforms
- Does not instrument:
 - pre-built libraries
 - inline assembly

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Agenda

- AddressSanitizer (aka ASan)
 - recap from 2011
 - detects use-after-free and buffer overflows (C++)
- ThreadSanitizer (aka TSan)
 - detects data races (C++ & Go)
- MemorySanitizer (aka MSan)
 detects uninitialized memory reads (C++)
- Similar tools, find different kinds of bugs

AddressSanitizer (recap from 2011)

- Finds
 - buffer overflows (stack, heap, globals)
 - use-after-free
 - some more
- LLVM compiler module (~1KLOC)
 - instruments all loads/stores
 - inserts red zones around Alloca and GlobalVariables
- Run-time library (~10KLOC)
 - malloc replacement (redzones, quarantine)
 - Bookkeeping for error messages

ASan report example: use-after-free

int main(int argc, char **argv) { int *array = new int[100]; delete [] array; return array[argc]; } // BOOM % clang++ -01 -fsanitize=address a.cc && ./a.out ==30226== ERROR: AddressSanitizer heap-use-after-free READ of size 4 at 0x7faa07fce084 thread T0 #0 0x40433c in main a.cc:4 0x7faa07fce084 is located 4 bytes inside of 400-byte region freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x4058fd in operator delete[](void*) asan rtl #1 0x404303 in main a.cc:3 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x405579 in operator new[](unsigned long) asan rtl

#1 $0 \times 4042f3$ in main a.cc:2

ASan shadow memory



ASan *marketing* slide

- 2x slowdown (Valgrind: 20x and more)
- 1.5x-4x memory overhead
- 500+ bugs found in Chrome in 1.5 years
 - Used for tests and fuzzing, 2000+ machines 24/7
 - 100+ bugs by external researchers
- 1000+ bugs everywhere else
 - Firefox, FreeType, FFmpeg, WebRTC, libjpeg-turbo, Perl, Vim, LLVM, GCC, MySQL

Plea to hardware vendors

Trivial hardware support may reduce the overhead from 2x to 20%

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Example: third access

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Read in thread T3				
	0:2	4:8	0:4	
	W	R	R	

Example: race?

Race if **E1** does not "happen-before" **E3**

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E1	E2	E3	
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Trophies

- 200+ races in Google server-side apps (C++)
- 80+ races in Go programs
 25+ bugs in Go stdlib
- Several races in OpenSSL
 1 fixed, ~5 'benign'
- More to come
 We've just started testing Chrome :)

Key advantages

- Speed
 - \circ > 10x faster than other tools
- Native support for atomics
 - Hard or impossible to implement with binary translation (Helgrind, Intel Inspector)

Limitations

- Only 64-bit Linux
- Hard to port to 32-bit platforms
 - Small address space
 - Relies on atomic 64-bit load/store
- Heavily relies on TLS
 Slow TLS on some platforms
- Does not instrument:
 - pre-built libraries
 - inline assembly

MemorySanitizer uninitialized memory reads (UMR)

MSan report example: UMR

```
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    int x[10];
    x[0] = 1;
    if (x[argc]) return 1;
```

• • •

% clang -fsanitize=memory -fPIE -pie a.c -g
% ./a.out

WARNING: MemorySanitizer: UMR (uninitialized-memory-read) #0 0x7ff6b05d9ca7 in main stack_umr.c:4 ORIGIN: stack allocation: x@main

Shadow memory

- Bit to bit shadow mapping
 1 means 'poisoned' (uninitialized)
- Uninitialized memory:
 - Returned by malloc
 - Local stack objects (poisoned at function entry)
- Shadow is propagated through arithmetic operations and memory writes
- Shadow is unpoisoned when constants are stored

Direct 1:1 shadow mapping

Shadow = Addr - 0x40000000000;



Shadow propagation

- Reporting UMR on first read causes false positives
 E.g. copying struct {char x; int y;}
- Report UMR only on some uses (branch, syscall, etc)
 That's what Valgrind does
- Propagate shadow values through expressions
 - A = B + C: A' = B' | C'
 - $\bigcirc A = B \& C: A' = (B' \& C') | (~B \& C') | (B' \& ~C)$
 - Approximation to minimize false positives/negatives
 - Similar to Valgrind
- Function parameter/retval: shadow is stored in TLS
 - Valgrind shadows registers/stack instead

Tracking origins

- Where was the poisoned memory allocated?
 - a = malloc() ... b = malloc() ... c = *a + *b ... if (c) ... // UMR. Is 'a' guilty or 'b'?
- Valgrind --track-origins: propagate the origin of the poisoned memory alongside the shadow
- MemorySanitizer: secondary shadow
 - Origin-ID is 4 bytes, 1:1 mapping
 - 2x additional slowdown



MSan overhead

- Without origins:
 - CPU: 3x
 - RAM: 2x
- With origins:
 - CPU: 6x
 - RAM: 3x + malloc stack traces

Tricky part :(

- Missing any write instruction causes false reports
- Must monitor ALL stores in the program
 libc, libstdc++, syscalls, etc

Solutions:

- Instrumented libc++, wrappers for libc
 - Works for many "console" apps, e.g. LLVM
- Instrument libraries at run-time
 - DynamoRIO-based prototype (SLOW)
- Instrument libraries statically (is it possible?)
- Compile everything, wrap syscalls
 - Will help AddressSanitizer/ThreadSanitizer too

MSan trophies

- Proprietary console app, 1.3 MLOC in C++
 - Not tested with Valgrind previously
 - 20+ unique bugs in < 2 hours
 - Valgrind finds the same bugs in 24+ hours
 - MSan gives better reports for stack memory
- 1 Bug in LLVM
 - LLVM bootstraps, ready to set regular runs
- A few bugs in Chrome (just started)
 - Have to use DynamoRIO module (MSanDR)
 - 7x faster than Valgrind

Summary (all 3 tools)

- AddressSanitizer (memory corruption)
 - A "must use" for everyone (C++)
 - Supported on Linux, OSX, CrOS, Android,
 - WIP: iOS, Windows, *BSD (?)
- ThreadSanitizer (races)
 - A "must use" if you have threads (C++, Go)
 - Only x86_64 Linux
- MemorySanitizer (uses of uninitialized data)
 - WIP, usable for "console" apps (C++)
 - Only x86_64 Linux

Q&A

http://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/

http://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/

http://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/

ASan/MSan vs Valgrind (Memcheck)

	Valgrind	ASan	MSan
Heap out-of-bounds	YES	YES	NO
Stack out-of-bounds	NO	YES	NO
Global out-of-bounds	NO	YES	NO
Use-after-free	YES	YES	NO
Use-after-return	NO	Sometimes	NO
Uninitialized reads	YES	NO	YES
CPU Overhead	10x-300x	1.5x-3x	3x

Why not a single tool?

- Slowdowns will add up
 Bad for interactive or network apps
- Memory overheads will multiply
 ASan redzone vs TSan/MSan large shadow
- Not trivial to implement