Dear Colleague: Last spring I proposed to the faculty to establish a Faculty Merger Review Committee to evaluate the benefits, costs, and risks of the proposed Rice-BCM merger. The faculty resolved to have this commitee established. The Committee, chaired by Don Morrison, will make a report to the faculty in a special faculty meeting on August 28. Unfortunately, I am attending a conference in Siberia (yes, they will let me come back) and will not be able to attend the meeting. Several people urged me to to communicate directly with the faculty on this matter. This should not be viewed as a "minority report". I fully stand behind the report that will be delivered to the faculty on Friday. Nevertheless, I do have have personal take on these issues, which I'd like to share with you. Unquestionably, a merger with BCM clearly brings with it many potential benefits, including many possible collaborations in scholarsip and education, as well as increased visibility in the biosciences. In addition, a path of no action may be risky to Rice and bring about long-term decline. At the same time, the merger would bring with it many costs and risks: (1) Many collaborations currently exists between Rice and BCM. The possibility of developing new collaborations between Rice and BCM without a merger has not been explored. (2) Many potential new collaborations have been described, but with little analysis of why they have not occured so far. The difficulty of realizing a wish list of potential collaborations has been underplayed, and the cost underestimated. The reality is that most medical schools are "academic islands". (3) The posibility of investing directly in the biosciences at Rice has not been adequately explored. It is not clear that an investment in the merger is better for Rice than investment in its bioscience programss. (4) There may be risks to Rice of not merging with BCM, but a careful analysis of these risks has not been offered, and alternative action plans have not been adequately explored. (5) The merger would impose on Rice a significant financial burden at a time that it is already straining under a very challenging budgetary environment, following a substantial decline in the endowment. (6) because of the large size differential between Rice and BCM, the merger would expose Rice to the inherent volatility of medical schools and the inherent instability of relationships in the Texas Medical Center. (7) Successful implementation of the merger would require deft execution in a very challening environment; the BRC experience shows the extreme difficulty of successful execution of similar projects. (8) The fact that after a year of negotiations no satisfying arrangement for BCM partnerships has yet been found indicates the complexity of the problem. The more complex and creative the solution is, the higher the risk of unsuccessful execution. (9) BCM is currently on a downward trend. There is a significant risk that it may continue to decline in stature even after a merger. Rice may find itself having acquired a mediocre medical school. (10) The merger would create one of the most unbalanced academic institutions in the US, with a very small university attached to a very large medical school. The impact of such an imbalance on Rice's mission has not been carefully analyzed. For these reasons, I believe that the merger proposition is exceedingly risky. While it has the potential to lift Rice to the next level, it also has the potential to cause irreparable harm to Rice. The costs and the risks are high enough to place the burden of proof on those who advocate the merger. In my opinion, a compelling case for the merger has yet to be made. While not taking action is also risky, I believe that rushing into action is riskier. I am particularly troubled by how "unscholarly" the process has been. Sober and unbiased inquiry is the essence of our academic business. Over the past year, I have seen various memoranda produced by the Rice Administration arguing for the merger. In my opinion, it is fairly clear to a reader of these memoranda that their conclusions preceded their analysis. (All of these memoranda are classified "Confidential" and have not been shared with the faculty at large.) FMRC has made an effort to engage in a more objective analysis, but its ability to do so during the summer, with limited access to resources and information, is restricted. Finally, I am mostly troubled by the minor role assigned to the faculty by the Administration in this matter. Clearly, a merger decision is a corporate decision and is appropriately in the province of the Board of Trustees. Still, quoting the distinguished Columbia physicist I.I. Rabi, "the faculty is the university." It is clear that that if the decision is taken to merge, then faculty involvement and support are necessary for the merger to be successful. Nevertheless, the Administration has been careful not to seek formally any expression of faculty support. (Last spring's survey indicated that only a minority of the faculty are in support of the merger.) Personally, having spent a signifcant part of my career in corporate research, I am chagrined to see this university turn into a "corporate university". You can find more merger-related material at http://www.cs.rice.edu/~vardi/rice/ (Rice access only). You are welcome to write back to me. Sincerely, Moshe Y. Vardi