Hack-a-Vote: Demonstrating Security Issues with Electronic Voting Systems

Authors

Jonathan Bannet
David W. Price
Algis Rudys
Justin Singer
Dan S. Wallach

Abstract

A representative democracy depends on a universally trusted voting system for the election of representatives; voters need to believe that their votes count, and all parties need to be convinced that the winner and loser of the election were declared legitimately. Direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems are increasingly being deployed to fill this role. Unfortunately, doubts have been raised as to the trustworthiness of these systems. This article presents a research voting system and associated class project which was used to demonstrate several classes of bugs that might occur in such a voting system unbeknownst to voters, with the difficulty of detecting these bugs through auditing. The intent of this project is to justify the mistrust sometimes placed in DRE voting systems that lack a voter-verifiable audit trail.

Published

Rice University, Department of Computer Science Technical Report TR-03-427, Houston, Texas, November, 2003.

Text

PDF (109 kbytes)

Related Links

Voting (in)security project in Comp527