Incentives-Compatible Peer-to-Peer Multicast
Tsuen-Wan "Johnny" Ngan, Dan S. Wallach, and Peter Druschel
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Abstract.
Many peer-to-peer (p2p) system designs assume cooperative environments,
with all clients correctly running the same software.
Any client who modifies its software may be able to unfairly benefit. This
paper considers such fairness issues in the context of p2p multicast
streaming services. We present mechanisms that can distinguish
nodes with selfish behavior and reduce the quality of service
experienced by these selfish nodes from their peers. The peers
make their judgments strictly by observing the behavior of their
upstream peers. We only require that the multicast trees be periodically
rebuilt, increasing the likelihood that a freeloading node's
downstream peers will later be upstream of the freeloader and can
retaliate by refusing to serve the offender.
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