Incentives-Compatible Peer-to-Peer Multicast
- Tsuen-Wan "Johnny" Ngan
Dan S. Wallach
- Many peer-to-peer (p2p) system designs assume cooperative
environments, with all clients correctly running the same software. Any client
who modifies its software may be able to unfairly benefit. This paper considers
such fairness issues in the context of p2p multicast streaming services. We
present mechanisms that can distinguish nodes with selfish behavior and reduce
the quality of service experienced by these selfish nodes from their peers.
The peers make their judgments strictly by observing the behavior of their
upstream peers. We only require that the multicast trees be periodically rebuilt,
increasing the likelihood that a freeloading nodes downstream peers
will later be upstream of the freeloader and can retaliate by refusing to
serve the offender.
- 2nd Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 2004.
- PDF (96 kbytes)
Dan Wallach, CS
Department, Rice University
Tue 29-Jun-2004 11:19